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The Charter of Whiteness:  
Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining 
Racial Injustice in the  
Canadian Criminal Justice System 
David M. Tanovich 
Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community’s 
psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist 
views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of 
negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions, including the 
criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereotypes. 
These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of 
racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil. 
R. v. Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353, at 369  
(Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. 
Aboriginal people are overrepresented in virtually all aspects of the 
[criminal justice] system. As this Court ... noted in R. v. Williams ... 
there is widespread bias against aboriginal people within Canada, 
and “[t]here is evidence that this widespread racism has translated 
into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system.” ... The 
figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in  
the Canadian criminal justice system. ... The unbalanced ratio of 
imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number of sources 
... [including] bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate 
institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse bail and to impose 
more and longer prison terms for aboriginal offenders. 
R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688,  
at paras. 61, 64-65 (S.C.C.), Cory and Iacobucci JJ. 
The community at large and the courts, in particular, have come, some 
would say belatedly, to recognize that racism operates in the criminal 
justice system ... With this recognition has come an acceptance by the 
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courts that racial profiling occurs and is a day-to-day reality in the 
lives of those minorities affected by it. 
Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 
43 C.R. (6th) 175, at para. 94 (Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As we reflect on the 25-year anniversary of the Canadian Charter  
of Rights and Freedoms,1 much will be written about the impact this 
constitutional document has had on those living at the margins. While 
no sweeping generalizations are possible when dealing with such complex 
issues, it is fair to say that some groups such as women and gays and 
lesbians can point to a number of significant victories ranging from the 
right of reproductive choice to the right to same-sex marriage. Can  
the same be said of racial injustice in the criminal justice system?  
The manifestations of this injustice include over- and under-policing, 
discriminatory bail, trial and sentencing outcomes, and mass incarceration. 
They have been well documented in study after study over the last 20 
years.2 Has the Charter given any hope to Aboriginal and racialized 
communities that fundamental justice is possible? 
This paper’s thesis is that while there is reason to be optimistic 
about the possibilities for future reform, the Charter has, to date, had very 
little impact on racial injustice in Canada. We continue to incarcerate 
                                                                                                            
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 See Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2007); Stolen Sisters:  
A Human Rights Response to Discrimination and Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada 
(Ottawa: Amnesty International Canada, 2004); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters 
Relating to the Death of Neil Stonechild (Regina: Queen’s Printer, 2004); Legacy of Hope: An Agenda 
for Change (Final Report from the Commission on First Nations and Metis People and Justice Reform) 
(Regina: Queen’s Printer, 2004); Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (Toronto: 
Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003); Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal 
People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996); Report of 
the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 
1995); Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: The Justice System and Aboriginal 
People (Volume 1) and The Deaths of Helen Betty Osbourne and John Joseph Harper (Volume 2) 
(Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991); Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian 
Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The 
Task Force, 1991); Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice, Report No. 34 (Minister’s Reference) 
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991); Findings and Recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (Halifax: The Royal Commission 1989); Final 
Report: Task Force on Aboriginal Peoples in Federal Corrections (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1989). 
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Aboriginals and African Canadians at alarming rates,3 racial profiling at 
our borders and in our streets continues to flourish,4 and the federal 
government continues to propose legislation that will further entrench 
the problem.5 Of course, some might say that it is simply naive to think 
that the Charter can make a difference and so Part II of the paper briefly 
addresses this larger philosophical question. In Part III, the paper explores 
why it is not the Charter that is the problem, but rather those who apply 
and interpret it. Racial justice has not had a chance to grow over the last 
25 years because there has been a significant failure of trial and appellate 
lawyers to engage in race talk in the courts and a failure of the judiciary 
to adopt appropriate critical race standards when invited to do so. 
The discussion is not meant to criticize or to lay blame but rather to 
show just how many opportunities we have had to make meaningful 
reform in this area over the life of the Charter. The message is one of 
hope for what is possible with the appropriate calibration and imagination. 
The paper is also, in many respects, a response to Justice Michael 
Moldaver’s state of the criminal union and, in particular, his belief that 
“[m]any of the Charter issues that you are likely to encounter on a day-
to-day basis have been thoroughly litigated, all the way to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. By and large, the governing principles are now firmly 
established.”6 Nothing could be further from the truth when it comes to 
race-based Charter litigation. 
II. THE UTILITY OF USING LITIGATION TO ADDRESS RACIAL 
INJUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As noted earlier, some may argue that the central question being 
explored here is a doomed one because it assumes that Charter litigation 
can bring about real change. Oppression is far too deeply rooted, the 
argument goes, to expect a document focused on individual rights and 
                                                                                                            
3
 See Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System” (Research 
Paper Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry) online: (The Ipperwash Inquiry) <http://www. 
ipperwashinquiry.ca/policy_part/research/index.html> (date accessed: March 7, 2008). 
4
 See David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2006), at chapters 4-7. 
5
 See, for example, Bill C-2, the Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6. 
6
 See Michael Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials: Masters of a System They Are Meant to 
Serve” (2005) 32 C.R. (6th) 316. For criticisms of Moldaver’s thesis, see Don Stuart, “The Charter 
Is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed to Be Stunted — Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 
40 C.R. (6th) 280; James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter and 
Criminal Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R (2d) 381. 
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applied by largely White middle-class judges to make any meaningful 
structural change.7 And while it is true that there have been significant 
Charter victories for some marginalized groups, these critics would likely 
respond that they are largely symbolic in nature, resulting in little or no 
real change. What good is it, for example, to recognize same-sex marriage 
and then permit homophobic state and religious officials to refuse to 
perform marriage ceremonies? 
There is much truth to these responses and there is no question that 
litigation as a political strategy for reform has a number of inherent 
limitations.8 However, successful litigation brings with it, in addition to 
the individual and systemic remedies fashioned, considerable attention, 
whether it be in the media, community organizations, universities and 
law schools, or at judicial conferences. This can help to raise public 
consciousness, stimulate academic research9 and teaching,10 and mobilize 
                                                                                                            
7
 There is also the argument that the criminal justice system itself is so inherently flawed 
that it is incapable, no matter the scope of the reform, of respecting Aboriginal conceptions of  
justice. See Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 1995), at chapter 12. This broad and complex philosophical question is well 
beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed. See also H.S. LaForme, “The Justice 
System in Canada: Does it Work for Aboriginal People?” (2005) 4 Indigenous L.J. 1. 
8
 For a critical discussion of using litigation to stimulate social change, see W.A. Bogart, 
Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and 
Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Christopher Manfredi, 
Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: Legal Mobilization and the Women’s Legal Education and 
Action Fund  (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform 
and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993). 
9
 Outside of the work of Scot Wortley, a criminologist at the University of Toronto, there 
is very little empirical work being conducted in Canada on systemic racism in the criminal justice 
system, particularly in Western Canada. For a discussion of Wortley’s work, see David M. 
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 75-76. 
10
 Currently, there are relatively few critical race theory or practice courses at Canadian 
law schools. We are, however, beginning to see the issue of the Charter, race and criminal justice 
becoming more prominent in the Canadian academic literature. See, for example, David M. 
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada  (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Kent 
Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice  
(University of Toronto Press, 1999), at chapters 7 and 8; Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 250, 314-18, 415-16, 418, 497-99; 
Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 
6-6 - 6-10; 9-17, 11-3. While these authors have explored the intersection of a number of Charter 
rights and racism, there are other academics and commentators who have explored the issue in relation 
to particular rights, most often in relation to section 9. See, for example, James Stribopoulos, “The 
Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. 
L.Q. 299; Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58. With respect 
to other legal rights, see Christine Boyle, “Annotation to R. v. Law (2002) 48 C.R. (5th) 199; Sujit 
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political action. One of the most important political responses could be 
the collection of data which will reveal the extent and scope of racial 
injustice in policing and other facets of the system.11 
Moreover, the idea that the democratic or the legislative process will 
bring anti-racist change to the criminal justice system is sheer folly. 
There is no evidence over the last decade that it will ever occur given 
the increased politicization of crime and unconscious nature of systemic 
racism.12 As Professor Stuart has noted, “[p]oliticians of all stripes have 
been unable to resist the political expediency of pandering to the 
perceived need to toughen penal responses. There are no votes in being 
soft on crime.”13 The absence of any racial profiling legislation either 
                                                                                                            
Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional Remedies 
and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Diana Lumba, “Deterring Racial 
Profiling: Can Section 24(2) of the Charter Realize Its Potential?” (2006) 22 Windsor Rev.Legal & 
Soc. Issues 79; Faizal Mirza, “Examining Racism and Criminal Justice: The Advancement of a 
Defence Based on Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in Camille 
Nelson & Charmaine Nelson, eds., Racism, Eh? A Critical Inter-Disciplinary Anthology of Race 
and Racism in Canada (Concord: Captus Press, 2004), at chapter 5; Larry Chartrand, “Aboriginal 
Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449; Faizal Mirza, “Mandatory 
Minimum Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491; Cynthia 
Peterson, “Institutionalized Racism: The Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection Process” 
(1993) 38 McGill L.J. 147. 
11
 See Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial Discrimination (Ontario Human Rights 
Commission, 2005), at 44-48; David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 173-77. See further Andrew Taslitz, “Racial Auditors and the 
Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action” (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 221; David Harris, “The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of 
Data Collection” (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 71. 
12
 The only example of a non-punitive anti-racist approach to criminal justice is section 
718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, enacted in 1996. The initiative was part of 
Bill C-46, Canada’s first comprehensive sentencing legislation, which was primarily aimed at 
reducing the reliance on imprisonment in Canada. Section 718.2(e) demands that judges pay 
particular attention to the lived experience of Aboriginal offenders when sentencing them. See R. v. 
Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). The provision, however, has had little 
impact in addressing the problem. For a discussion of some of the structural and procedural reforms 
necessary to ensure greater effectiveness, see Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Criminal Justice System” (Research Paper Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry) online: (The 
Ipperwash Inquiry) <http://www.ipperwashinquiry.ca/policy_part/research/index.html> (date accessed: 
March 7, 2008), at 47-68. In R. v. Borde, [2003] O.J. No. 354, 172 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that a similar approach should be applied when sentencing African 
Canadian offenders. But see R. v. Hamilton, [2004] O.J. No. 3252, 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C.A.) 
which has limited Borde’s application in drug cases. See further the discussion in Dale Ives, 
“Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and the Relevance of Social Disadvantage in 
Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004) 30 Queen’s L.J. 114. 
13
 See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005), at 14-16. See also Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law 
and Politics of Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press, 1999), where Professor Roach points 
out that one of the reasons that women have had so much success in bringing about criminal law 
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provincially or federally,14 the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act by the 
Liberal government15 and the recent package of Conservative Criminal 
Code16 amendments which, among other initiatives, add new and increased 
mandatory minimums for gun offences,17 are just a few examples. All of 
these initiatives have had and will have a disproportionate impact on 
racialized communities. 
And so, Charter litigation remains an important means of addressing 
fundamental injustice. In theory, it should have a significant impact. 
This is especially true with respect to racial injustice in the criminal 
justice system because of the inexorable ties between the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the Charter and the criminal justice system.18 
The legal rights in sections 7-15 and the remedial provision that is section 
24 are the most litigated Charter rights and the litigation is occurring in 
the criminal context because of access and motivation. As a general rule, 
accused have access to the courts to launch a Charter challenge by virtue 
of access to state-funded legal counsel. And, of course, one would expect 
that accused are motivated to argue all live issues. This is why it is often 
said that criminal accused act as surrogate litigants to ensure that civil 
liberties and human rights are respected by the state. Indeed, as a result 
of the racialized litigants who were successful in R. v. Khan,19 R. v. 
                                                                                                            
reform in the area of sexual assault is precisely because it permitted the government to promote its 
crime control agenda, an agenda that remains popular on election day. 
14
 Libby Davies has twice attempted to introduce a racial profiling private member’s bill 
(An Act to Eliminate Racial Profiling) in the House of Commons with no success. See David M. 
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 172. 
15
 See Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada 
Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures 
respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001, 
S.C. 2001, c. 41. Bill C-36 received Royal Assent on December 18, 2001 and came into force on 
December 24, 2001. The Act is scheduled to receive a facelift from the Conservative government 
given that the five-year sunset clause has now expired on two of the Act’s powers (i.e., investigative 
hearings and preventative arrest) and the motive clause was struck down: R. v. Khawaja, [2006] 
O.J. No. 4245, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. S.C.J.). In addition, in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court struck 
down the security certificate regime in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
16
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
17
 See Bill C-2: Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6 (Royal Assent February 28, 2008). 
Other initiatives include removing personal violent offences from conditional sentence eligibility 
(see Bill C-9: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment), S.C. 2007,  
c. 12. Bill C-9 received Royal Assent on May 31, 2007 and came into force six months from that date. 
18
 See Carol Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory: Racism and the Law  (Halifax: 
Fernwood, 1999). 
19
 [2004] O.J. No. 3819, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 49 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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Brown,20 R. v. Campbell21 and R. v. Nguyen,22 we are beginning to see, at 
least in the context of racial profiling, a greater number of human rights 
and civil cases where individuals not found with contraband are challenging 
the conduct of the police. Substantial damages and systemic remedies 
have been imposed in successful cases.23 
Moreover, while systemic racism is present in all social systems, 
one can reasonably argue that some of the most harmful and lasting 
effects of racial injustice are caused by the criminal justice system. The 
collateral effects of over-incarceration and constant surveillance (e.g., 
racial profiling) on racialized communities are enormous and now well 
documented.24 They include physical and severe psychological harm (in 
some cases death), isolation, alienation and mistrust, behaviour changes, 
breakdown of or damage to family and social networks, and labour 
market exclusion.25 Indeed, in many ways, colonialism, slavery and 
                                                                                                            
20
 [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.). 
21
 [2005] Q.J. No. 394 (C.Q.). 
22
 [2006] O.J. No. 272 (Ont. S.C.J.). See also R. v. Nguyen, [2006] O.J. No. 1221 (Ont. C.J.); 
R. v. Mac, [2005] O.J. No. 527 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
23
 See most notably, Nassiah v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2007] O.H.R.T.D. 
No. 14 (O.H.R.T.) ($20,000); “Three [Montreal] Transit Guards Found Guilty of Racial Profiling” 
The Gazette (15 July 2006) ($15,000); Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd., [2005] 
B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 302 (B.C.H.R.T.) ($5,000); Johnson v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) Police 
Service, [2003] N.S.H.R.B.I.D. No. 2 ($10,000) (N.S.H.R.B.I.). There are a number of other cases 
pending before both the Ontario and Quebec Human Rights Commissions. 
24
 The extent of the incarceration crisis in the African Canadian and Aboriginal communities 
is evident from 1992/1993 data from Ontario which show that African Canadians accounted for 60 
per cent of admissions to provincial institutions in Metropolitan Toronto for drug trafficking/importing 
offences, and from 2001 data which reveal that Aboriginals made up 77 per cent, 69 per cent and 38 
per cent of offenders in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta correctional facilities. See David M. 
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 88-89 
and Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System” (Research Paper 
Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry) online: (The Ipperwash Inquiry) <http://www.  
ipperwashinquiry.ca/policy_part/research/index.html> (date accessed: March 7, 2008), at 14. In the 
federal system (2005-2006), Aboriginals made up 18.7 per cent of incarcerated offenders, 
while Aboriginal women made up 31.4 per cent of women offenders who are incarcerated. See 
“Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview – 2006”, online: Public Safety Canada, 
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/cprmindex-en.asp> (date accessed: 2 September 2007). 
In 2002, Aboriginals constituted 21 per cent of all individuals in prison across Canada. See 
“Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System”, at 14. 
25
 See, for example, the discussion in Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial 
Profiling (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003), at 16-66; Dorothy E. Roberts, “The 
Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities” (2004) 56 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1271; Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., Introduction to Invisible Punishment: The 
Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration (New York: The New Press, 2003); Gabriel Chin, 
“Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction” (2002) 6 J. Gender 
Race & Just. 253; Dorothy E. Roberts, “Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage 
of Over-Enforcement” (2001) 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1005. 
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segregation are now reproduced through both of these modern-day systems 
of control and incapacitation. 
While I place considerable reliance on Charter litigation to address 
racial injustice, there is no question that other legal and extra-legal 
strategies are necessary in order to ensure implementation of the changes 
and to fill in the gaps when litigation fails. Anti-racist training for all 
criminal justice actors, the creation of monitoring systems, the creation 
of more anti-racist actors such as Gladue workers (i.e., those who 
prepare sentencing reports for Aboriginal offenders), the appointment of 
more Aboriginal and racialized judges, greater funding for community 
programs, community mobilization and political lobbying are all examples 
of strategies that can work together with litigation. Having tried to justify a 
call for more and enhanced use of the Charter, the paper now moves to 
an exploration of how it is that a “Charter of Whiteness” has been created. 
III. THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH THE CHARTER BUT WITH  
THOSE WHO ARGUE AND INTERPRET IT 
1. Adjudication and the Failure to Act 
Narrow approaches to judicial review and lack of judicial imagination 
have played a role in limiting the impact of Charter litigation on racial 
injustice. In a number of key cases addressing issues such as bail, jury 
selection and racial profiling, courts have refused to adopt critical race 
standards or arguments when they were advanced. Some of these cases 
include: 
• R. v. Laws26 — The accused argued that the citizenship requirement 
for jury duty in section 2 of the Juries Act27 violated section 15(1) 
because it had a disproportionate impact on African Canadians. The 
argument was rejected on narrow and statistical grounds. There was 
evidence led at the trial in 1993 that 34.1 per cent of the Black 
residents of Toronto are non-citizens while only 14.4 per cent of the 
non-Black residents are non-citizens. There was additional evidence 
that if the citizenship requirement in the Juries Act were removed 
the probability of choosing a Black person on the jury would increase 
from 3.2 in 100 to 4.1 in 100, representing an increase of 0.9 per cent. 
The Court of Appeal held that: 
                                                                                                            
26
 [1998] O.J. No. 3623, 128 C.C.C. (3d) 516 (Ont. C.A.). 
27
 R.S.O. 1990, c. J.3. 
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 In light of the Parks/Williams challenge for cause and other 
safeguards to ensure trial fairness, the slight statistical advantage 
to a black accused of permitting non-citizens to serve on a jury 
does not constitute an advantage for the purposes of s. 15. The 
inclusion of non-citizens would not materially increase the possibility 
that a black juror will in fact end up on the jury, bearing in mind 
that the statistical probability of choosing a black person on the 
jury is increased by less than 1%. The burden was on the appellant 
to show that he was deprived of a real benefit or advantage. He 
does not meet that burden by merely pointing to these statistics. 
We are unable to draw the inference that this statistical probability 
would materially enhance trial fairness for the appellant or any 
other black accused.28 
The Court did not address the concerns expressed by the Ontario 
Systemic Racism Commission that the “main systemic barriers to 
participation of black and other racialized people on trial juries 
appear to be the citizenship qualification and the database used to 
list the names from which jurors are selected” and that “citizenship 
restriction for jurors seems particularly anomalous since no such 
restriction applies to justices of the peace, lawyers, or judges, all of 
whom are familiar with community standards.” Nor did the Court 
consider the Commission’s recommendation that “... the Juries Act 
be amended to permit landed immigrants to serve as jurors if they 
have lived in Canada for three years and are otherwise eligible.”29 
The Court also did not consider the broader section 15(1) argument 
that there is a miscarriage of justice any time a key element of the 
trial process is implicated in racial discrimination. It was arguably 
able to avoid dealing with this broader argument by its previous 
decision in R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto30 that an accused 
had no standing to use section 15(1) to argue that the equality rights 
                                                                                                            
28
 [1998] O.J. No. 3623, 128 C.C.C. (3d) 516, at 540 (Ont. C.A.). 
29
 See Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995), at 250-52. The problem surrounding the lack of Aboriginal 
and racialized jurors on Canadian juries is discussed in Cynthia Peterson, “Institutionalized Racism: 
The Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection Process” (1993) 38 McGill L.J. 147. 
30
 [1997] O.J. No. 1548, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 51-56 (Ont. C.A.). 
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of a prospective juror, in this case a racialized non-citizen, were 
violated.31
 
• R. v. Hall32 — The Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario (“CLA”), 
relying on the empirical work of the Ontario Systemic Racism 
Commission, made substantial submissions on the impact of race on 
bail decisions in a Charter section 11(f) constitutional challenge to 
section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.33 This section gives broad 
discretion to justices of the peace to detain accused who are not a 
danger or flight risk, but where a determination is made that denial 
of bail is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of 
justice. The Commission had found the following racial disparities 
in pre-trial detention decisions: 
• White accused were more likely to be released by the police or 
not detained following a bail hearing than Black accused. 
• White accused were treated more favourably even though they 
were more likely than Black accused to have a criminal record 
and to have a more serious record. 
• In drug cases, White accused were twice as likely to be released 
by the police than Black accused. Black accused were three 
times more likely to be denied bail than White accused. 
• Employment status accounted for some of the racial inequality 
in imprisonment before trial, but it does not fully explain the 
disparities. 
It thus concluded that “some black accused who were imprisoned 
before trial would not have been jailed if they had been white, and 
some white accused who were freed before trial would have been 
                                                                                                            
31
 This narrow approach to standing is criticized in David M. Tanovich, David M. Paciocco 
& Steven Skurka, Jury Selection in Criminal Trials: Skills, Science and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
1997), at 21-26. 
32
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.). 
33
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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detained had they been black.”34 The CLA submissions were not 
considered in either the majority or dissenting opinions.35
 
• R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer36 — Sawyer, who is White, was tried together 
with Galbraith, who is Black, on a charge of assault. Following the 
conviction, a juror contacted Sawyer and told him that she had been 
under “undue pressure to come to a verdict and that certain racial 
comments were made by other members of the jury”. The accused 
argued that the common law jury secrecy rule needed to be altered 
under section 7 of the Charter to ensure that verdicts were not tainted 
by racism. The argument was rejected. 
• R. v. Gayle37 — The accused argued that the trial judge had erred in 
not expanding the scope of the questions on a R. v. Parks38 challenge 
for cause to ensure a more effective means of detecting unconscious 
racial bias. The standard Parks question asks whether the juror would 
be able to judge the evidence without bias, prejudice or partiality 
knowing that the accused is Black and, if applicable, the victim is 
White. In Gayle, the defence wanted to ask questions such as the 
following: 
• Would you agree or disagree that some races are, by their nature, 
more violent than others? 
• Would you agree or disagree that it is appropriate for Black 
people and White people to marry each other? 
• Would you agree or disagree that there are too many Black people 
living in Toronto? 
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 See Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995), at iv-v, chapter 5. See also Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, 
“Remand for Plea: Bail Decisions and Plea Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions” (2002) 42 
Brit. J. Crim. 186. The failure of the Supreme Court to address this data is criticized by Stuart, 
“Annotation” (2002) 4 C.R. (6th) 201. 
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 The Commission specifically identified the reverse onus for drug offences contained in 
s. 515(6)(d) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 as contributing to the disparity. It thus 
recommended that it be abolished. See Recommendation 5.8, Report of the Commission on Systemic 
Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995), at 158. The 
reverse onus was upheld in R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.), but 
at that time neither the Court nor counsel had the benefit of the Commission’s data or analysis. 
36
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344 (S.C.C.). 
37
 [2001] O.J. No. 1559, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 221 (Ont. C.A.). 
38
 [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.). 
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The argument was rejected. In fairness to the Court of Appeal, there 
was conflicting expert evidence at trial on the utility of the additional 
questions and the Court did recognize that: 
It may well be that with the benefit of experience and the help of 
expert analysis on how best to uncover and assess racial bias, the 
challenge for cause process can be improved over time.39 
Following Gayle, courts have refused to expand the Parks question.40 
• R. v. Spence41 — In Spence, the victim was South Asian and the 
accused was Black. The African Canadian Legal Clinic (“ACLC”) 
argued that the racial background of the victim should be part of the 
Parks challenge for cause question to ensure that racial partiality 
directed at the victim did not infect the trial process. The Court did 
not directly address the ACLC’s argument. Instead, it focused on 
the issue from the perspective of the accused and on juror sympathy 
or empathy (i.e., whether a juror would convict because of a race-
based sympathy for the victim) rather than the broader question of 
partiality. In other words, it did not consider that a juror could vote 
to acquit because of bias towards the victim and the societal interest 
in ensuring that verdicts are not racially tainted. The decision has 
enormous implications for the ability of parties to seek a challenge 
for cause in cases where it relates to a witness or the complainant. 
Indeed, Binnie J. seems to close the door with this comment: 
The eventual logic of the defence argument, it seems, is that courts 
should take judicial notice of a “realistic possibility” of racial 
partiality in every case where the jurors, accused, complainant and 
witnesses are not all of the same race.42 
• Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board43 — The African 
Canadian Legal Clinic argued for a reverse onus in racial profiling 
civil cases (i.e., placing the burden of proof on the police). 
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 R. v. Gayle, [2001] O.J. No. 1559, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 221, at 239 (Ont. C.A.). 
40
 See, for example, R. v. McKenzie, [2001] O.J. No. 4858 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
41
 [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 (S.C.C.). 
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 [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458, at para. 6 (S.C.C.). For earlier jurisprudential 
support for a challenge in a case where the accused was White and the deceased was Aboriginal, 
see R. v. Rogers, [2000] O.J. No. 3009, 38 C.R. (5th) 331 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
43
 [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] 
S.C.C.A. No. 10 (S.C.C.). 
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The argument was rejected. The Court appears to have left the issue 
open. As Justice Doherty observed: 
... [the submission] is based on the argument that racial profiling 
is so common that where it is alleged, placing the burden on the 
police to disprove racial profiling is more likely to achieve an 
accurate result than is leaving the onus on the party alleging racial 
profiling. ... 
 The reality of racial profiling cannot be denied. There is no way 
of knowing how common the practice is in any given community. 
I am not prepared to accept that racial profiling is the rule rather 
than the exception where the police detain black men. I do not 
mean to suggest that I am satisfied that it is indeed the exception, 
but only that I do not know.44 
Presumably if a better evidentiary record is put before the Court, the 
result might be different.45 
• Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)46 — The 
Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR-CAN”) 
and Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association (“CMCLA”) 
argued that the Court should factor in the racial profiling problem 
when interpreting the constitutionality of provisions enacted in the 
national security context. They further argued that the security 
certificate regime under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act47 
violates section 15(1) of the Charter because it is being applied in a 
discriminatory manner by targeting Arab and Muslim men and it is 
creating “a chilling effect among members of a disadvantaged group.”48 
Although the Supreme Court did strike down the security certificate 
regime, it did not address the racial profiling or equality arguments. 
Another troubling example of judicial reluctance to address racism 
in the justice system can be seen in R. v. Lines.49 In that case the Crown 
brought a motion seeking a declaration that section 15(1) prevented the 
defence from exercising its peremptory challenges to remove Black 
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 Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175, 
at 209 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 10 (S.C.C.). 
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 For an argument in favour of a reverse onus in criminal cases, see David M. Tanovich, 
The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 144-47. 
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 [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
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 S.C. 2001, c. 27, entered into force June 20, 2002. 
48
 Quoting from their factum, a copy of which is on file with the author. 
49
 [1993] O.J. No. 3284 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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jurors. The case involved a White police officer charged with shooting a 
young Black male who was running away.50 The motion was dismissed. 
According to the trial judge: 
In a criminal trial the accused is pitted against the state. In my opinion 
it is fanciful to suggest that in the selection of a jury he doffs his 
adversarial role and joins with the Crown in some sort of joint and 
concerted effort to empanel an independent and impartial tribunal. ... 
. . . . . 
 For these reasons, the Crown motion to restrict the use of the 
peremptory challenge is dismissed. The Crown will be guided by its 
own conscience in its use of the peremptory challenge and so will the 
accused.51
 
According to a media report of the trial, defence counsel, a senior 
member of the Ontario bar, used one of his peremptory challenges to 
exclude a Black hospital diet clerk from the jury after she had been 
found to be impartial by the two triers of fact. While no statement was 
made by Lines’ lawyer as to why he felt that this juror was inappropriate, 
because none is given in this context, it is reasonable to infer racial 
discrimination was at least part of the reason. I say reasonable because 
(1) the case involved a racially charged incident of a police shooting; (2) the 
defence did not consent to the Crown motion to prevent him from 
exercising his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion; and 
(3) of the seven peremptory challenges counsel used, four were used to 
exclude racialized jurors.52 
A more obvious case of intentional discrimination occurred in the 
trial of James Houghton and Dwayne Johnston, two White men charged 
in the brutal death of Helen Betty Osbourne, a 19-year-old Aboriginal 
woman from The Pas, Manitoba. On November 13, 1971, Osbourne was 
stabbed with a screwdriver more than 50 times and her face smashed 
beyond recognition. It took 15 years before the RCMP finally charged 
three of the four men, even though the men were identified as the killers 
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 Unlike challenges for cause, which require a showing of an “air of reality” of partiality, 
peremptory challenges under s. 634(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 can be used as 
of right. The number of such challenges is dependent on the seriousness of the charge. 
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 R. v. Lines, [1993] O.J. No. 3284, at paras. 26, 29 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In the United States, 
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fashion. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
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 The jury ultimately consisted of 11 White jurors and one Asian juror. Lines was acquitted. 
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by the police in 1972.53 Johnston was also represented by a senior 
member of the criminal bar in Manitoba. During jury selection, counsel 
used six of his peremptory challenges to exclude all of the Aboriginal 
jurors that had made it to the jury box.54 As a result, there were no 
Aboriginals on the jury.55 Defence counsel’s conduct was specifically cited 
by the Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry as an instance of racism: 
The systemic removal of potential Aboriginal jurors from the jury panel 
was motivated by their being Aboriginal persons. The jury selection 
process permitted racism to be applied.56 
Even today, it remains unclear whether or not the Charter would 
prevent what occurred in these two cases, although it has been argued 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct now ethically prevent a lawyer 
from using peremptory challenges in this fashion.57 In an ironic twist of 
fate, Brian Trafford, one of the prosecutors in the Lines trial, was appointed 
to the bench and presided over the “Just Desserts” trial, another emotionally 
and racially charged trial in Toronto. This time it was the defence who 
brought a motion to limit the Crown from using its peremptory challenges 
in a discriminatory fashion. Justice Trafford held that he had the 
jurisdiction to regulate the use of peremptory challenges by the Crown 
and the defence to prevent discriminatory conduct.58 
The issue arose again in R. v. Gayle,59 a case involving a Black accused 
charged with shooting and killing a White police officer. During jury 
selection, the Crown used two of its peremptory challenges to exclude 
two Black jurors. The jury that tried the case had two racialized jurors 
but neither was African Canadian. On appeal, the accused argued that 
his section 11(f) and 15(1) Charter rights were violated by the Crown’s 
conduct. He also argued that the section 15(1) rights of the two Black 
jurors had been violated. Relying on its earlier decision in R. v. Church 
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 One of the three, Lee Colgan, was granted immunity in exchange for testifying against 
Houghton and Johnston. The fourth man, Norman Manger, was never charged. 
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 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: The Justice System and Aboriginal 
People (Volume 1) and The Deaths of Helen Betty Osbourne and John Joseph Harper (Volume 2) 
(Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 85-88. 
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(Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 93-94. 
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Canada” (2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267, at 293-94. 
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 See R. v. Brown, [1999] O.J. No. 4867 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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 [2001] O.J. No. 1559, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 221 (Ont. C.A.). 
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of Scientology of Toronto,60 the Court of Appeal held that the accused 
had no standing to vindicate the rights of the jurors. The Court also 
declined to decide whether his rights had been breached because the 
issue was raised on appeal for the first time and, in the Court’s view, an 
insufficient evidentiary record existed.61 
What is more troubling perhaps is that the language used by the 
Court suggests that it only recognized a jurisdiction to review the exercise 
of race-based peremptory challenges because it was Crown conduct that 
was involved. Justice Sharpe, for the Court, held: 
 An important part of the jury selection process is the right of both 
the Crown and the defence to exercise peremptory challenges. The 
very essence of a peremptory challenge is that its exercise requires no 
justification or explanation. ... 
. . . . . 
 There is little authority on the extent to which a court can review 
the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the Crown. While I do not 
think the circumstances of the present call for this court’s intervention, 
I would not want these reasons to be read as eliminating the possibility, 
as there may well be instances in which it would be appropriate for a 
court to do so. There are two important legal principles that lead me to 
that view. First is the well-established principle of our law that the Crown 
bears a particular responsibility in conducting a criminal prosecution 
... It is not appropriate for Crown counsel to seek a conviction at all 
costs. ... 
. . . . . 
 The second principle that constrains the discretionary powers of 
the Crown is that the Crown must exercise the discretion accorded to it 
in conformity to Charter principles and values. ...62 
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 [1997] O.J. No. 1548, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 
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2. Hostile Adjudication 
In a number of cases, trial judges have been or appeared hostile when 
asked to adjudicate a race issue. Sometimes the hostility can be implied 
from the reasoning employed by the Court to dismiss the argument. A 
good example of this is the number of challenge-for-cause cases that 
were brought following R. v. Parks63 in areas outside of Metropolitan 
Toronto. They were dismissed on the grounds that defence counsel had 
failed to establish that racism extended beyond the borders of Toronto.64 
It took a sternly worded judgment from McMurtry C.J.O. in R. v. Wilson 
to stop this nonsense: 
 It is unrealistic and illogical to assume that anti-black attitudes 
stop at the borders of Metropolitan Toronto. ... The possibility therefore 
of anti-black racism taking root in communities outside of Metropolitan 
Toronto ... should be a matter of concern for the criminal justice system.65 
Other times, the disdain of the trial judge can be implied from the 
manner in which he or she controls the proceedings. In R. v. Watson, for 
example, the Ontario Court of Appeal observed: 
 We have carefully considered the appellant’s claim that the trial 
judge’s interjections at trial compromised trial fairness by impeding 
the defence’s ability to effectively cross-examine the police witnesses 
on critical areas of their testimony including, in particular, on the defence 
assertion that the activities of the police were motivated by racial 
profiling. We are satisfied, on a review of the transcripts as a whole, 
that the combined effect of the frequency and nature of the trial judge’s 
interjections during the conduct of the trial created the appearance of 
an unfair trial.66 
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 [1996] O.J. No. 1689, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 86, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.). 
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 [2004] O.J. No. 4921, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 144, at 148 (Ont. C.A.). 
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In some cases, it is more direct. In R. v. Brown,67 the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that the trial judge’s conduct raised a reasonable apprehension 
of bias. That conduct included an extraordinary suggestion in his reasons 
for sentence that Brown apologize to the officer for raising racial profiling: 
I should say as well that I do not know whether my tone this afternoon 
might have displayed my distaste for the matters that were raised during 
the course of the trial, but that really is not relevant to determining the 
sentence. I do not disagree with the officer’s initial assessment of you. 
You dealt with him apparently in a polite and courteous way, and I had 
the impression when you were giving your evidence that you are that 
sort of person. So there is nothing inherently reprehensible about your 
conduct that I think should be treated as an aggravating factor when it 
comes to imposing sentence, which is not to say that it would not be 
nice if perhaps you might extend an apology to the officer because, I 
am satisfied, the allegations were completely unwarranted. But that is 
only my assessment. You are not required to share it and I will leave it 
to you to do what you think is right in that regard.68 
These instances of judicial reluctance and hostility certainly tend to 
confirm the theory that the composition of the judiciary and inherent 
conservatism of judicial review are some of the biggest hurdles in using 
litigation as a political tool of change. There is no question that increasing 
the diversity of the bench is one of the most pressing issues facing the 
justice system and that it will have a big impact on increasing the 
cultural competence of the judiciary. As for judicial conservatism, while 
the cases discussed earlier are very troubling, it may still be premature to 
reach any conclusions given that our courts are not, generally speaking, 
being asked to develop critical race standards or adjudicate race cases 
with any regularity. 
3. The Sounds of Trial Silence 
With respect to litigation, there has been a large-scale failure of trial 
lawyers to raise race once critical race standards have been established 
by the courts. The most cogent evidence of this is the small number of 
racial profiling cases that have been litigated following the decision of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Brown69 despite the fact that there 
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 [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.). 
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are likely hundreds of such cases each year.70 There are other examples 
as well. No one has, since racial profiling emerged as a live issue in Charter 
jurisprudence, challenged the legitimacy of R. v. Ladouceur,71 the case 
that has provided the police with a racial profiling writ of assistance.72 
Nor has there been a post-Pearson challenge to the reverse onus for 
drug offences at bail hearings given the findings and recommendations 
of the Ontario Systemic Racism Commission.73 
And there have been few attempts to apply R. v. Parks74 outside of 
the challenge for cause process. Parks established a number of propositions 
about the nature of racial bias that are now capable of being judicially 
noted. They include: 
Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community’s 
psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist 
views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of 
negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions,  including  
the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative 
stereotypes. ...75 
 The criminal trial milieu may also accentuate the role of racial 
bias in the decision-making process. Anti-black attitudes may connect 
blacks with crime and acts of violence. A juror with such attitudes who 
hears evidence describing a black accused as a drug dealer involved in 
an act of violence may regard his attitudes as having been validated by 
the evidence. That juror may then readily give effect to his or her 
preconceived negative attitudes towards blacks without regard to the 
evidence and legal principles ...76 
As Binnie J. observed in Spence, “Parks show[s] that a black accused 
has reason to fear that some members of the ... community may be wrongly 
influenced by the colour of his or her skin.”77 A similar observation was 
made in R. v. Williams in relation to Aboriginals. Justice McLachlin, as she 
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then was, for the Court held “[r]acism against aboriginals includes  
stereotypes that relate to credibility, worthiness and criminal propensity.”78 
Two contexts where Parks79 and Williams80 are very relevant include 
Crown motions to introduce bad character evidence and defence motions 
to limit the cross-examination of the accused on his or her criminal record 
otherwise known as a Corbett application. In other words, it is open for 
counsel to develop an argument that systemic racism and stereotyping is 
a relevant factor to take into account when assessing the admissibility of 
character evidence and criminal record in a case involving a racialized 
accused.81 In other words, it is possible to argue for the creation of a 
“race shield” provision much like the rape shield provision that operates 
in sexual assault cases to prevent unwarranted and damaging stereotypes 
from infecting the criminal trial.82 
Why are trial lawyers not raising race when it is appropriate to do 
so? While the perception of judicial hostility is an easy scapegoat for 
many lawyers,83 I think that the real reason for the silence is as noted in 
“The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases”: 
[Race is] not being raised because some lawyers are not seeing the 
issue, while others are uncomfortable engaging in race talk before our 
courts. Other lawyers, who are aware of the issue, may shy away from 
raising race because they believe that they have a strong argument 
using traditional constitutional principles or because they are simply 
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 Even assuming that there is genuine fear, the perception of judicial hostility should never 
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not sure of how to factor in race and racial profiling into a framework 
of analysis under sections 9 and 24 of the Charter.84 
With respect to “not seeing the issue”, this occurs because, for the most 
part, Whites do not see themselves as a race or everyday conduct as the 
product of White privilege. As Professor Coker so aptly puts it: 
The third problem for confronting white complacency (or encouragement) 
of race disparities in the criminal justice is the invisibility (to whites) 
of white privilege. Whites seldom think of themselves through the lens of 
race; whiteness is invisible to most whites. Rather, whites see themselves 
and other whites as individuals. Because they cannot see the privilege 
that protects them from police maltreatment and suspicion, they have 
difficulty believing that such treatment is not in some way invited or 
provoked when it happens to others.85 
It should be pointed out, in fairness, that defence lawyers are not the 
only participants in the justice system who have difficulty in understanding 
or engaging in race talk. One need only recall the conduct of one of the 
lawyers from the Nova Scotia Department of Public Prosecutions who, 
in the mid-1990s, accused a Black judge in Halifax of racial bias for 
pointing out, in response to a Crown question suggesting that the police 
never lie, that systemic racism in policing is a problem in Halifax.86 And 
not to forget, of course, that six of the 13 appellate judges who heard the 
appeals of the case concluded that this reality check raised a reasonable 
apprehension of bias.87 
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4. The Sounds of Appellate Silence 
On a number of occasions, appellate lawyers have also failed to 
raise the issue of race on appeal. For example, no argument was made in 
R. v. Law,88 despite uncontradicted evidence from one of the officers 
that amounted to racial profiling. That evidence was summarized by 
Bastarache J. as follows: 
Corporal Desroches worked for the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the 
Moncton Police Force; he had been suspicious of the appellants from 
shortly after the restaurant’s opening. He testified that his suspicions 
of wrongdoing were not substantiated, but that he had “a gut feeling” 
that they were not submitting all their taxes and that he “didn’t know 
what [he] was gonna to find”. Prior to the break and enter, Corporal 
Desroches had copied down the licence plate numbers of several 
patrons’ vehicles. He was keeping information in relation to a file 
named “Asian Crimes” and inquired with Revenue Canada as to 
whether the restaurant’s taxes had been paid. He was told by Revenue 
Canada that there was nothing irregular about the restaurant’s 
operations.89
 
In Law,90 the accused, who operated a restaurant, were charged with 
an offence under the Excise Tax Act.91 A safe from the restaurant had 
been stolen and abandoned in a field. The police found it. It was Desroches 
who, after learning that the safe had been found, was given permission 
by the Crown to photocopy the documents found in the safe. He then 
contacted Revenue Canada and, based on the information contained 
therein, they searched the restaurant and discovered that the accused had 
not been remitting the required GST. The Court held that Desroches’ 
conduct constituted an unreasonable search that violated section 8 of the 
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Charter. While the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to 
exclude the evidence under section 24(2), a racial profiling argument 
would have given the Court its first opportunity to address the issue.92 
While like trial lawyers, appellate lawyers are prone to “not seeing” 
the issue or are unsure of how to factor race into the legal mix, they face 
the additional hurdle of not having a record from which to work. In R. v. 
Clayton, for example, Doherty J. observed: 
Counsel for Farmer also argued that the trial judge erred in not 
recognizing that the police were engaged in racial profiling when they 
stopped Farmer’s vehicle. Counsel, who also acted for Farmer at the 
trial, apparently first appreciated that this was a case of racial profiling 
some time after the trial was over. Racial profiling was not an issue at 
trial. No questions or arguments were directed to that issue. 
. . . . . 
 I can dispose of the racial profiling argument quickly. There is no 
basis in the trial record for this submission which, as indicated above, 
was made for the first time on appeal. It is unfair to those who are the 
target of this serious allegation to raise it for the first time on appeal. 
In addition, advancing a claim of racial profiling where it is so obviously 
devoid of merit tends to trivialize a matter of serious concern within 
the community. Not only was there no evidence of racial profiling,  
for the reasons I will set out, the police were wrong to ignore the 
information that the perpetrators were “black males” in deciding who 
to stop at their roadblock.93 
Justice Doherty is undoubtedly correct that raising a claim of profiling 
for the first time on appeal (or at trial) with no merit is a serious matter. 
But it is not clear why an appellate court should not be entitled to draw 
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an inference of profiling where there is a strong circumstantial case. 
Since most profiling is unconscious, is there really any point in putting 
the suggestion to the officer? What can he or she reasonably be expected 
to say in response to the question?94 Moreover, why would a situation 
like this be any different from when an appellate court impugns the 
conduct of a trial Crown or judge or witness without first giving them an 
opportunity to respond? 
The recent case of R. v. Harris95 provides a good example of where 
racial profiling could have been raised on appeal for the first time. In 
Harris, the officer stopped a vehicle for a purported improper turn with 
Harris, an African Canadian, in the front passenger seat.96 The officer 
asked Harris for identification. While Harris was not wearing a seatbelt, 
the trial judge concluded, based on the officer’s testimony, that the 
purpose behind the request for identification was to conduct a Canadian 
Police Information Centre (“CPIC”) check. The check was to determine, 
in his words, “whether persons were on probation or bail, or whether they 
were under some ‘level of surveillance’”. The officer testified that this 
was a routine practice. 
When looked at with the proper social context lens of racial profiling, 
these facts cried out for a finding of racially biased policing. It is rare 
that the circumstantial evidence of heightened scrutiny will be stronger. 
The officer’s testimony that he always asked passengers for identification 
in order to conduct a CPIC check during a routine traffic stop could 
reasonably have been rejected. It is simply not credible and not consistent 
with the conduct of a reasonable police officer. Alternatively, and even 
more troubling, is that it may in fact be true because the officer stops a 
disproportionately high number of racialized drivers. Either way, it was 
testimony that was not strong enough to rebut the circumstantial evidence, 
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especially bearing in mind that the standard of proof is on a balance of 
probabilities. 
While appellate lawyers may be constrained in alleging racial profiling 
for the first time on appeal in the absence of a fresh evidence application, 
they face no such impediment in raising race in other contexts for the 
first time on appeal.97 For example, since the issue of whether the accused 
was detained so as to trigger section 9 or section 10 of the Charter is an 
objective one and does not require the accused to testify, an appellate 
court can consider race as one contextual factor just as it could consider 
age or other relevant factors even where they are not relied upon below.98 
Similarly, when assessing the seriousness of a Charter breach under 
section 24(2), an appellate court can consider, especially when it is 
deciding whether to exclude afresh, the extent to which the impugned 
conduct will have a disproportionate impact on racialized communities 
and the measures taken by the police to address systemic problems 
including racial profiling. This could be done even in the absence of a 
specific finding of racial profiling.99 It should be noted, however, that 
simply pointing out the disproportionate impact without also raising the 
sufficiency of the measures taken by the police to address the problem 
may not be enough. In R. v. Harris,100 for example, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal recognized that the disproportionate effects of over-policing felt 
by racialized communities is a relevant consideration in assessing the 
seriousness of the violation: 
The use of the broad powers associated with Highway Traffic Act stops 
to routinely investigate passengers who have nothing to do with the 
concerns justifying those stops must have a significant cumulative, 
long-term, negative impact on the personal freedom enjoyed by those 
who find themselves subject to this kind of police conduct. While for 
persons in some segments of the community, these stops may be 
infrequent, this record suggests that for others the stops are an all too 
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familiar part of their day-to-day routine. Viewed from the perspective 
of those who are most likely to find themselves stopped and questioned 
by police, I think this form of interrogation is anything but trivial. It 
seems to me at some point it must become provocative.101 
However, the Court did not find that the violation in the case was serious 
enough to warrant exclusion. 
Yet another relevant context is Charter appellate litigation that involves 
the creation of new standards because courts will, in deciding the 
breadth of the standard, take into account the extent to which it will 
ensure justice for all. In R. v. Belnavis,102 for example, a police officer 
searched the contents of a number of garbage bags containing clothes in 
the back seat of a vehicle he had purportedly stopped for speeding. The 
vehicle contained three Black women (Belnavis, the driver, and two 
passengers including Lawrence). Racial profiling was not argued at trial 
or on appeal. The Crown conceded that the search was unreasonable 
under section 8 because it was made in the absence of probable cause, but 
the Supreme Court did not exclude the evidence of the stolen clothing 
found in the bags under section 24(2). It further held that as a passenger, 
Lawrence had no standing to challenge the search of the car and, in the 
absence of any connection to the bags, standing to challenge that search 
either. 
Nevertheless, La Forest J., in his dissenting opinion, was prepared to 
take race into account when determining how to approach the standing 
issue. He noted that: 
In this case the majority’s approach virtually eviscerates the right of a 
wide range of passengers in an automobile to be left alone by the 
police, and allows the police to importune even those considered to 
retain some element of privacy. I find the approach wholly inappropriate 
in a free society and quite simply disturbing in its general implications. 
. . . . . 
 Moreover, the Court’s understanding of the implications of the police 
action may be obscured by the fact that most cases that come before 
them relate to someone who has already been convicted. The courts 
have little “feel” for what this means to persons who have committed 
no wrong or any idea of the number of such people who may be harassed 
by the overly zealous elements in any police force. … 
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 [This case] has grave implications for equality in the application 
of the law. ... It does not prove but certainly does not detract from this 
thesis that the appellants in the present case are both members of a 
visible minority.103 
When a court is establishing new Charter standards, even a White 
litigant can make a critical race argument. As Sopinka J. recognized in 
R. v. DeSousa: 
It is clear that as the liberty interest of the appellant is ultimately at risk 
in this appeal, the appellant has the right to question the constitutional 
validity of the provision under which he is charged. This is the case 
even though the unconstitutional effects may not be directed at the 
appellant per se ...104 
This is why in R. v. Ladouceur,105 Sopinka J., in his dissenting opinion 
on whether random vehicle stops constituted a reasonable limit under 
section 1 of the Charter, was able to point out that: 
By contrast, the roving random stop would permit any individual 
officer to stop any vehicle, at any time, at any place. The decision may 
be based on any whim. Individual officers will have different reasons. 
Some may tend to stop younger drivers, others older cars, and so on. 
Indeed, as pointed out by Tarnopolsky J.A., racial considerations may 
be a factor too.106 
(emphasis added) 
And so, in R. v. Malmo-Levine,107 a case involving a constitutional 
challenge to the marijuana possession law, the lawyers and interveners 
could have relied on the social context evidence that the war on drugs 
has had a disproportionate impact on racialized communities in Canada 
in support of the gross disproportionality argument that was ultimately 
rejected by the Supreme Court.108 
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Appellate lawyers looking for empowerment can also now turn to a 
number of recent cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly adopted 
critical race standards in constitutional adjudication. In R. v. Golden, 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., for the majority, held in the context of 
determining the appropriate Charter standards for strip searches incident 
to arrest under section 8: 
The intervener African Canadian Legal Clinic (ACLC) agrees with the 
appellant that probable cause and a warrant requirement should be 
required for strip searches to be constitutional under s. 8 of the Charter. 
The ACLC says that given the negative stereotyping of African Canadians 
by police and the large number of African Canadians who are stopped 
and searched by police, a public process of obtaining a warrant is required 
to reduce the danger of racist stereotyping by individual police officers, 
who are more likely than a neutral arbiter to conclude that a strip search of 
a black person is appropriate. The intervener Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto (ALST) also advocates a regime of prior authorization for strip 
searches ... 
. . . . . 
... we believe it is important to note the submissions of the ACLC and the 
ALST that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are overrepresented 
in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely to represent a 
disproportionate number of those who are arrested by police and 
subjected to personal searches, including strip searches (Report of the 
Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (1991), Vol. 1, The Justice 
System and Aboriginal People, at p. 107; Cawsey Report, Justice on 
Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its 
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (1991), Vol. II, p. 7, 
recommendations 2.48 to 2.50; Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide (1996), at pp. 33-39; Commission 
on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of 
the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
System (1995)). As a result, it is necessary to develop an appropriate 
framework governing strip searches in order to prevent unnecessary 
and unjustified strip searches before they occur.109 
In Golden, race was not raised as an issue at trial and yet this did not 
foreclose the approach the Court took to its constitutional analysis. The 
Supreme Court took a similar equality-oriented approach in Sauvé v. 
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Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) in finding that section 51(e) of the 
Canada Elections Act,110 which denies all prisoners serving a sentence of 
two years or more the right to vote, violates section 3 of the Charter 
which guarantees every citizen the right to vote.111 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This refusal of judges to act and lack of race consciousness by lawyers 
are having a direct impact on the ability of the Charter to remedy racial 
injustice. We can see this by examining two of the bright spots: race-based 
challenges for cause and the recognition of the existence of racial profiling 
by our courts. With respect to challenges for cause, there is no question 
that R. v. Parks112 stands out as one of the most significant Charter race 
cases. The cases that followed such as R. v. Williams113 and R. v. Koh114 
have established that Aboriginal and all racialized accused are entitled 
to challenge prospective jurors for racial bias as of right under section 
638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.115 But the utility of Parks and Williams 
has been limited by the failure of the courts to permit a more sophisticated 
manner of questioning. Judging the impartiality of a prospective juror 
on his or her yes or no answer to a question which simply asks whether 
the juror believes that he or she can be impartial in a case with a Black 
or Aboriginal accused is not sufficient.116 It is time to relitigate this issue. 
Similarly, to permit lawyers to use race-based peremptory challenges and 
not to give accused standing to argue the section 15(1) rights of prospective 
jurors is simply to close one’s eyes and further enable racism in the justice 
system. 
                                                                                                            
110
 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 [repealed by S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 576]. 
111
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). As McLachlin C.J.C. held, for the 
majority (at para. 60), in assessing the proportionality prong of the s. 1 analysis: 
The negative effects of s. 51(e) upon prisoners have a disproportionate impact on 
Canada’s already disadvantaged Aboriginal population, whose overrepresentation in prisons 
reflects “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system”: R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 
688, at para. 64, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ. 
112
 [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.). 
113
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.). 
114
 [1998] O.J. No. 5425, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.). 
115
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
116
 There is also a more fundamental question of the competence of jurors to make 
impartiality determinations, especially since at the beginning of the process, the initial triers are not 
themselves prescreened. This is something that needs to be addressed by Parliament. 
684 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
With respect to racial profiling, while it is true that the recent decisions 
from our courts and human rights tribunals are significant,117 the standards 
they have imposed are having little effect, in part, because of other 
sections 8, 9 and 24(2) cases which limit their application. For example, 
section 9 is only triggered upon a detention and the courts have applied 
a narrow approach to street-level detentions with little consideration of 
the relevance of race on the issue of psychological detention.118 As the 
Supreme Court held in R. v. Mann, “... the police cannot be said to ‘detain’, 
within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they 
stop for purposes of identification, or even interview.”119 Hopefully, the 
Court will reconsider its approach when it decides R. v. Grant.120 It 
would do well to consider the reasoned judgments in R. v. Griffiths;121  
R. v. Pinto;122 and, R. v. Savory,123 all of which employed a critical race 
perspective on this issue. These cases recognize that it is unreasonable 
to conclude that an African Canadian or Aboriginal would feel free to 
walk away from the police given the history of police violence and racial 
profiling in their communities. 
Moreover, section 8 can only be advanced where the individual has 
standing (i.e., reasonable expectation of privacy) and again courts have 
adopted a narrow approach to this issue as we saw in R. v. Belnavis.124 
                                                                                                            
117
 See R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.); Peart v. Peel 
Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175 (Ont. C.A.), leave to 
appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 10 (S.C.C.); R. v. Campbell, [2005] Q.J. no 394 (C.Q.); 
Nassiah v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2007] O.H.R.T.D. No. 14 (O.H.R.T.). 
118
 The issue of race and detention has been explored in a number of previous pieces. See 
David M. Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 84, at 
93-96; David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2006), at 147-49. 
119
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 19 (S.C.C.). Mann was followed in  
R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290. See also R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
(Ont. C.A.), where the Court of Appeal left open the question of whether a passenger in a vehicle  
is detained when the car is pulled over by the police. Although (at para. 19) the Court did hold  
(in response to the Crown argument): 
The trial judge doubted the correctness of the submission. So do I. It is inconsistent 
with trial decisions in this province: e.g. see R. v. Pinto, [2003] O.J. No. 5172 (S.C.J.); R. v. 
J.R.M., [2005] O.J. No. 4708 (C.J.). It also runs against the unanimous recent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. [127 S. Ct. 2400]. 
120
 [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] 
S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.). 
121
 [2003] O.J. No. 1544, 11 C.R. (6th) 136 (Ont. C.J.). 
122
 [2003] O.J. No. 5172, 113 C.R.R. (2d) 140 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
123
 [2002] O.J. No. 2715, 95 C.R.R. (2d) 261 (Ont. C.J.). 
124
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE CHARTER OF WHITENESS 685 
This issue is again before the Supreme Court in R. v. Brown125 in the 
context of the use of dogs to sniff for drugs. This is a critical issue 
because the use of dogs and other tactics such as securing consent to 
search by Operation Pipeline/Jetway/Convoy, a RCMP drug interdiction 
program, are having a disproportionate impact on racialized individuals.126 
And finally, as noted earlier, under section 24(2), the failure to raise 
race has too easily allowed courts to rely on good faith and the seriousness 
of gun and drug offences in not excluding evidence obtained in violation 
of the Charter. This is what is happening in the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in cases like R. v. Grant,127 R. v. Harris128 and now R. v. B. (L.).129 As 
Moldaver J. put it in R. v. B. (L.): 
 This case involves a loaded handgun in the possession of a student 
on school property. Conduct of that nature is unacceptable without 
exception. It is something that Canadians will not tolerate. It conjures 
up images of horror and anguish the likes of which few could have 
imagined twenty-five years ago when the Charter first came to being. 
Sadly, in recent times, such images have become all too common — 
children left dead and dying; families overcome by grief and sorrow; 
communities left reeling in shock and disbelief. 
 That is the backdrop of this case and in my view, it provides the 
context within which the conduct of the police should be measured ...130 
While the effects of gun violence are indeed tragic, so too are the 
consequences of racial profiling. That too was a backdrop of the case, 
one that was not raised and so not considered by the Court. It is interesting 
that the Court was prepared to take account of the effects of gun violence, 
even though there was no evidence before it, but not of racial profiling 
in Toronto because “no such allegations have been made”. 
And so, as these examples illustrate, engaging in race talk and 
developing critical race standards are critical because colour-blind due 
                                                                                                            
125
 [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 323 (S.C.C.), on appeal from [2006] A.J. No. 755, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 
317 (Alta. C.A.). 
126
 Although it is difficult to track cases since race is rarely mentioned in judgments, I was 
able to ascertain (by name or by contacting counsel) that of 25 reported QL cases involving 
Operation Pipeline/Jetway/Convoy, 14 involve racialized individuals. The link between Operation 
Pipeline and racial profiling is discussed in David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing 
Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 91-94. 
127
 [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] 
S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.). 
128
 [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.). 
129
 [2007] O.J. No. 3290 (Ont. C.A.). 
130
 [2007] O.J. No. 3290, at paras. 80-81 (Ont. C.A.). 
686 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
process standards are working disproportionately to the disadvantage of 
racialized groups. That is the future of Charter litigation in this country. 
There is no question that what lies ahead will be difficult. There is every 
reason, however, to be optimistic. Lawyers and judges are committed to 
the pursuit of justice and with a greater understanding of what needs to 
be done and commitment to getting it done, we may begin to see significant 
change. 
